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This paper provides an overview of the period prior to 
the recent global crisis, and the policies that were adopted 
around the world in response to the crisis. It highlights 
a number of key issues regarding economic and financial 
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worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at Rnallari@worldbank.org.  
policies that governments have faced both globally and 
nationally. These are related to the management of boom 
and bust episodes that deserve more attention in policy 
circles in the future.  1
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Introduction 
At times, externalities resulting from the policies of large countries
2 have caused global 
markets to suffer various types of “shocks”. 2008 and now 2009 have reminded us that what 
happens in large countries could have large impacts on the rest of the world. In 2007, the US 
accounted for 30% of world GDP, and 14% of world trade.  US stock market capitalization was 
145% of GDP with banks accounting for a quarter of the total stock market capitalization, and 
the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector at 210% of US GDP in 2007 (84 % of world 
GDP), was substantial. By comparison, credit to the private sector was 121% of GDP in the Euro 
area and 98% in East Asian countries in 2007. The US financial system had strong international 
links. The impact of the global crisis has been magnified for countries that are more globally 
integrated in goods, labor and capital markets. There have been a wide range of economic policy 
responses to manage the effects of the global economic and financial crisis on countries. 
Discussion regarding the various types of policies that countries should have adopted during the 
boom years of the 2000s and those that should be used to manage volatility and especially 
downturns are ongoing. International discussions have attempted to define global actions to 
encourage stability in global markets and to prevent future crises. For example, recent 
discussions on financial market regulation have explicitly considered how to enhance cross-
border cooperation in order to promote financial stability. This paper presents some of the key 
policy questions raised regarding economic management during booms and busts and the 
responses of governments around the world to the 2008-2009 crisis. 
The world’s economic crisis follows a period of prosperity (as many crises have done) 
and increasing integration. The world economy grew at an average of 4.1% in real terms during 
                                                 
2   Large countries are defined for this paper as countries accounting for a large share of world GDP (e.g. US, EU 
countries, and Japan), or are specialized centers of economic activity, or are financial hubs (e.g. UK), or suppliers or 
buyers of goods with market power (e.g. China, Saudi Arabia), or leaders in any other way. It could also refer to 
countries that are simply large relative to their most important economic partner.   3
2000-07 compared with 2.9% during 1990-99. Developing countries benefitted from the growing 
demand in higher income countries while themselves contributing more to world growth than in 
decades past.  World trade grew at an average of 7.1% in real terms during 2000-07,
3  so that in 
2007, world trade in goods and services was at 33% of world GDP compared to only 16% in 
1990 and 25% in 2000.
4  While the rise of China, and to a lesser extent India, has provided 
alternative markets for the developing world, and in regions like East Asia, intra-regional trade 
accounts for a much larger share of total trade than it did decade ago, the US and European 
Monetary Union countries still accounted for 50 % of world trade in 2007. 
5 
6  Moreover, a trade 
shock to one country, from say, US markets, could still be propagated widely to other trading 
partners, when production is internationally integrated.  
World trade growth was accompanied by large cross-border flows of funds both in terms 
of current transfers (e.g., workers’ remittances) as well as large capital account movements to 
fund national savings/investment imbalances. Remittances have boosted expenditures (and 
imports) in many developing countries rising from US$82.5 million in 2000 to US$ 199 million 
in 2005 to US$ 334 in 2008. Capital account flows between countries responded to both “push” 
factors (excess savings looking for high returns/ portfolio diversification) and “pull” factors 
(such as reforms in the receiving country, changing consumption patterns, better investment 
opportunities, better financial intermediation and innovation). For most small developing 
countries that participate in international financial markets, push factors probably played an 
important role in the years leading up to 2008 when capital flows to all developing countries 
                                                 
3 Computations based on the Oct 2009 WEO; world trade grew only 0.3% in volume terms in 2001. In 2008 world 
trade and growth both were 3%, though world trade has grown faster on average. 
4  Trade grew in HICs at 13.1% during 2000-07 compared to 5.% during 1990-99, while trade in MICs and LICs 
recorded a growth of around 23% each during 2000-07 compared with 4.9% and 11.3% respectively during 1990-
99. 
5 That proportion was   44.72 % in 2000- IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, Dec 2009.  
6  Brülhart and Thorpe (2000) observe important and similar   development levels in selected east-Asian countries 
trade along with substantial growing static and marginal intra-industry trade in each case. They also find the 
changing structure of East Asian trade patterns to be explained by fewer labor adjustment pressures.   4
increased. Net capital flows to emerging and developing economies was around US$65 billion 
during 1999-2002, rose to US$ 201 billion in 2004 and to US$ 617.5 billion in 2007.  
The commodity price “crisis”. The volatility and crisis of the latter half of the 2000s had 
their roots in this prosperity and interconnectedness. Growth in real incomes around the world 
led to continuous price increases in commodities.  A “crisis” of sorts took place during mid-
2007-mid-2008 when food and fuel prices, which had been increasing fast since 2005, both 
jumped up substantially.
7 The commodity price hikes in world markets are noteworthy for the 
distributional effects they had on world markets. As might be expected, oil exporters benefitted 
in the form of higher export revenues. In 2007, Kuwait had a current account surplus (CAS) of 
44.7% of its GDP, Qatar of 30.4%, and Saudi Arabia, of 24.3% of its GDP while Russia’s CAS 
was 6% of its GDP.  While commodity exporters in the Africa, Latin America and Middle East 
and North Africa regions saw external positions improving many oil-importers saw a significant 
widening of their trade deficits (e.g. Ukraine, Mongolia, Seychelles, Dem. Rep. of Congo, and 
Togo among others).  In addition, fiscal positions of many governments were changing along 
with commodity prices for a number of reasons: (i) governments that taxed fuel (or owned it) 
saw revenues rise; (ii) there were reductions in taxes and/or increases in subsidies for those who 
protected oil/food production or consumption; and (iii) governments put in place new subsidies 
to protect the poor.  For those that suffered negative effects from rising prices, the median fiscal 
cost of subsides, tax decreases, and other fiscal responses to rising commodity prices was 0.6% 
of GDP in 2006 and 0.7% of GDP in 2007. The total fiscal cost of responding to commodity 
price shocks has been estimated at 2% of China’s GDP, and over 3% of GDP for India.
 8  
                                                 
7 The food price spike is explained to a large extent by a confluence of factors, namely the advent of US bio-fuel 
subsidies and poor wheat harvests in some major exporters. The concomitant jump in fuel prices has been explained 
by a number of reasons, such as low inventories reflecting high demand and insufficient investment in new refining 
capacity, and the high cost of new exploration and development.GEP 2009. 
8 IMF Update on Food and Fuel Prices dated September 19, 2008.   5
But the food and fuel price shocks, though the largest and most protracted since 1900 
(GEP 2009) did not seem to have an appreciable effect on world growth, unlike the previous oil 
shocks. Several factors may explain this: the compensatory effect of other commodity price 
increases for several importing countries, a decline in fuel intensity in the world due to 
technological factors
9, a decline in the fuel needs of the developed world as they have moved 
away to service- led economies, and perhaps a substitution away from fuel as a response to rising 
prices over time. In addition, monetary policy in the advanced countries was accommodating, 
contrasting with the contractionary policies of the previous period aimed at fighting inflation.  
While all the above factors contributed to resilience in world growth, it is possible that had the 
increase been sustained for a longer period there would have been negative effects on growth, 
particularly in some emerging markets, and particularly if tighter monetary policy had eventually 
been adopted to contain inflationary pressures. Recent estimates from FAO suggest that the post-
crisis scenario for food prices does not augur well for developing country food importers as they 
are projected to rise again when the global downturn ends.
10 Commodity price developments 
remain a source of volatility in world markets. 
  A striking difference between booms in “real” factors as opposed to the booms in 
financial markets is that finance is “all pervasive” and the magnitude and swiftness with which a 
shock can spread is markedly higher. Every sector of the economy depends on the financial 
sector for transactions across space and time; the more developed the country, the more this 
tends to be the case.  The very role of finance is to provide links between activities 
(intermediation) where none would have existed through the production or consumption process. 
Second, the financial sector is notable for the speed with which changes in prices can occur.  
                                                 
9  OECD oil-intensity, defined as million barrels a day consumed as a proportion of GDP, decreased from 1.07 
during 1977-80 to 0.57 during 2004-06 
10 FAO’s latest Food Outlook suggests that the index of food prices climbed to 168 points in Nov 2009, the highest 
level since Sept. 2008. This is 21% below the peak in June 2008 but prior to 2007-2008; this index had never 
exceeded 120 and had usually been below 100.   6
This is partly because the costs of buying and selling financial assets are low and prices 
correspondingly flexible: sellers can exit quickly and buyers can enter quickly.  Third, financial 
sector developments can have a substantial and swift affect on expectations regarding the 
evolution of both individual and corporate wealth and the intertemporal evolution of national 
output. Finally, the financial sector seems to be especially prone to the effects of “animal spirits”. 
Though the crisis of 2007-2008 started in the US, it was soon rippling across borders. Its 
real effects, first transmitted through the financial system and then through the collapse of trade,  
commodity prices and remittances meant not only a US GDP growth slowdown for 2008 (growth 
was only 0.4%) and the EU (at 0.7%) but also a downturn of -2.7% and -4.2% respectively in 
2009. For many developing countries, the growth slowdown of 2008 is predicted to be a growth 
downturn in 2009 and a slow recovery in 2010.  
The paper examines the proximate “causes” of  the crisis, fiscal, financial, and monetary 
policies leading up to the bust, and policies that have been put in place to manage the crisis in 
both developing and developed countries. The first section covers the period before the crisis, the 
second section the crisis and the third section reviews the policies adopted and ongoing debates. 
 
I. The Triple “Causes” of the Crisis: Structural Imbalances, Macroeconomic 
and Financial Policies 
 
I.1. Structural Imbalances and Macroeconomic Policies  
For several years now the global economy has been characterized as suffering from 
“structural imbalances” or “excessively” high spending in some countries balanced by high 
savings in others.  The world distribution of borrowers and savers is distinguished by peaks- that 
is, there is a handful of countries accounting for a large proportion of the world’s savings and a   7
handful of large borrowers (in terms of world markets)
11 Around the world, there are fewer 
countries that have a CAS instead of a CAD. Figure 1a and b show some of the large deficit and 
surplus countries with the CAD or CAS in terms of both own and world GDP. In terms of world 
GDP the US CAD was at -1.6% in 2006, absorbing more than the surpluses of the Middle East 
countries and China. As shown in Tables 1a and 1c,  in 2007 (and particularly in 2008), the US 
CAD fell as a share of world GDP (and as a share of total CASes) while China’s share of the 
world surplus (relative to world GDP) increased over time (0.7% in 2007) as did the Middle 
East’s in 2008 (0.7%).
12 The US has been taking a smaller share of the world’s savings in the last 
few years (though the absolute value of the CAD in billions of dollars has been increasing). 
Among developing countries, the Eastern European CAD as a share of regional GDP was by far 
the highest at 8% in 2007 and 2008. The newly industrialized economies of East Asia by contrast 
had a CAS of 5.7% of regional GDP, and the ASEAN-5, of 5% as shown in Table 1b.  
Developing country CADs were financed by a variety of flows (Figures 2a-2d). The 
lion’s share of FDI has traditionally gone to countries in East Asia, levels rising even in 2008 and 
2009 while falling in Eastern European and CIS countries. Net private flows have been the 
highest in emerging Europe since 2005 (and the CIS countries overtook East Asia too in 2006) 
followed by E. Asian and Latin American (Western Hemisphere) countries. Private portfolio 
inflows have been extremely volatile; the East Asia region has intermittently suffered some large 
withdrawals.  Outflows of official capital were high in the period before the crisis, particularly 
from E Asia and Africa. The trend was reversed in 2008 and 2009 particularly for emerging 
Europe and CIS countries. 
                                                 
11 When the current account balance is measured relative to GDP, the ranking of highest to least changes – some 
small countries have current account balances that are very large relative to their output but small relative to world 
markets. Alternative measures are discussed here. 
12 Edwards (2007),  NBER on current account surpluses and the correction of global imbalances.   8
  Pre-crisis, aggregate demand booms and corresponding current account deficits (CADs) 
have been associated with rising asset prices in many countries. Table 2a shows that almost 
every country, (except Denmark) that had  housing price increases of 50% or more during 2002-
06 had a large current account deficit with Iceland, Latvia and Lithuania being top contenders for 
the latter.  Ukraine, South Africa, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania stand out with housing price 
booms near or over 100% and large CADs. Germany and Japan had the largest housing price 
depreciations among the countries in the list and a large CAS, while China benefited from both a 
CAS (as a result of its export strategy) and a housing price appreciation that was relatively small 
(31%). The stock market booms in this period are evident from the value of the stocks 
traded/GDP which jumped in the US (86%), the UK (118%), East Asia (427%) and Eastern 
Europe (100%) between 2004-2007.  
Asset price booms have been associated with fast domestic credit growth as witnessed in 
the US and several other countries, for example in Europe. Easy credit enhanced the incentives 
to borrow, increased investment in housing and as housing prices rose, consumers with higher 
wealth, raised spending. Rising prices in the US also facilitated further credit expansions in the 
form of home-equity loans. High credit growth to the private sector is reflected in the bank credit 
to GDP ratio which rose substantially in the US (especially in the latter part of the 2000s), the 
UK, in the countries of the ECA region (20 pp of GDP) and somewhat less in the Euro Area. In 
East Asia (especially China) it fell. In Latin America, credit to the private sector was at 38% of 
GDP, rising over 14pp of GDP from 2004 to 2008 but less than the ECA region.
13 
The nature of the aggregate demand boom may vary but many countries experienced 
investment booms in construction/real estate and with rising asset prices, fast consumption 
growth. Governments may choose to moderate or influence the direction that market participants 
                                                 
13 The growth rate of credit was much higher as was the growth rate of GDP.   9
follow. US fiscal, financial and monetary policy encouraged the housing and consumption 
booms in the US. If the burgeoning US CAD were to be explained by an enhanced desire for US 
consumers to consume today (a changed discount rate for example), the appropriate and 
complementary policy response would have been to adopt contractionary fiscal policy. 
14 Where 
increases in aggregate demand are explained by large (and potentially unsustainable) fiscal 
deficits, the “solution” would be to reduce public spending or raise taxes. The US has had a 
rising public sector deficit since 2001; from 2001 to 2008 total US public debt climbed from 
54% to 75% of GDP. Public finances have been a key contributor to large current account 
deficits which were 5.2% and 4.9% of US GDP in 2007 and 2008. Other fiscal policies included 
US homeowners’ tax exemptions on their mortgage interest payments giving them an incentive 
to purchase houses with large loans, and implicit guarantees on the housing corporations such as 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac who are charged with expanding domestic home ownership. 
Government policy encourages home buying among lower income purchasers.
15 By contrast, in 
2007 and 2008 the CASes as a ratio to GDP were 11% and 9.8% for China, 4.8% and 3.2% for 
Japan, and 7.5% and 6.4% for Germany. Fiscal policy was also conservative in Germany and 
China. Middle Eastern oil exporters also could substantially increase domestic expenditure 
through expansionary fiscal policy- Saudi Arabia’s fiscal surplus has increased continuously 
from 2004 (it had been falling during 2001-2004). 
Governments’ choice of overall monetary policy has had substantial implications for 
aggregate demand and current account deficits as well. In the US, monetary policy was 
supportive of the boom (Taylor, 2009) in the sense that more restrictive monetary policy and 
higher interest rates could have slowed credit growth. Instead monetary policy supported the 
                                                 
14 Policies aimed at managing aggregate demand become more complicated when partner countries also undertake 
actions that undermine needed relative price adjustments (such as depreciating their currencies to maintain their 
competitiveness). 
15 The housing boom facilitated spending by those who have a high propensity to consume out of income/wealth by 
giving ownership to poorer, more liquidity constrained consumers who borrowed on home equity   10
credit and asset price booms. Adjustment in a country’s external position through the returns on 
net foreign assets is affected by policy, for example exchange rates.
16 Finally, financial 
regulation of mortgage loans, and associated derivatives and supervision by commercial banks 
was insufficiently strong to contain risks. Expansionary monetary policies, fast growth of credit, 
a large fiscal deficit and fiscal incentives to borrow (e.g. for mortgages) all came together to raise 
aggregate demand and create vulnerabilities in financial markets.
17 Actions of the US authorities 
raise questions about how policies skewed private sector preferences and whether alternative 
policy choices might not have prevented the 2008 debacle. What was happening in the US was 
mirrored in some Western European countries to different degrees. Among countries that had 
credit booms many also had asset price booms. For example, in Spain banks had invested heavily 
in real estate (despite various constraints the Spanish authorities had established for credit 
growth). 
Emerging and low income countries show some variation. In Eastern and Central Europe 
a number of countries (such as Latvia, Romania, and Hungary) financed domestic demand 
booms (and in some cases, property booms) with external borrowing. Foreign bank subsidiaries 
borrowed from parents and lent significant amounts of capital to emerging market borrowers. 
Foreign ownership levels of Central, Eastern and Southeastern European banking sectors is 
amongst the highest in the world.
18  Most of the countries’ financial sectors are very exposed to 
Western European banks, particularly those from Austria, Germany and Italy, either directly 
through the corporate private sector or through domestic banking sectors.  For the Baltics, 
                                                 
16 Despite expansionary macroeconomic policies and high debt, historically, the US as a net debtor, paying low 
interest rates on its debt and earning higher interest rates on its foreign assets has had these offsetting earnings to a 
burgeoning CAD. 
17 Taylor , 2009, has a good discussion supporting the thesis that monetary policy in the US was overly 
expansionary, in the sense that it did not follow a Taylor rule for inflation targeting. . 
18 For example, asset share of foreign owned banks (in percent of total assets) is in the range of 75-98% in ascending 
order in Estonia, Slovakia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Lithuania, Albania, Romania, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Poland.     11
Swedish banks have been the most active creditors. Countries in emerging Europe saw some of 
the highest rates of domestic credit growth during the 2000s, particularly since 2005. In most 
cases, rising current account deficits reflected private spending increases, a buildup of external 
private debt, and an increase in foreign currency denominated obligations in the banking sector.  
The Latin American (LA) region saw an improvement in fundamentals during the 2000s. 
Fiscal deficits, a major cause of macroeconomic imbalances in the past- had been falling. This 
helped current account balances as did rising commodity prices, many countries being 
commodity exporters. Latin American growth performance and banking sector performance 
improved. During this period, dollarization of liabilities also declined in the Latin American 
countries relative to the 1990s.  Domestic credit growth in the LA region was more restrained.  
By dint of their strong export performance, high savings rates and strong fiscal positions 
East Asian countries have managed to maintain strong current account surpluses. For the East 
Asian countries, the response to the 1998 crisis was a build-up in reserves through a current 
account surplus (Edwards, 2007). Since the crisis of the latter half of the 1990s, the East Asian 
countries that had revealed their vulnerabilities have significantly improved the resilience of their 
financial sectors. In fact, credit growth to the private sector in East Asian countries was slower 
during the 2000s than it was during the latter half of the 1990s and credit to GDP declined in the 
2000s.  
The Middle East and North Africa region’s oil exporters benefitted from rising trade and 
commodity prices and worldwide growth. In South Asia and Africa, product and financial 
markets are not as globally integrated as in some of the other regions: capital mobility is 
restricted and trade restrictions are still high relative to most other regions.  But trade for these 
regions also grew with world growth. South Asia and Africa also gained with rising workers’ 
remittances; current account deficits were manageable for the most part. Macroeconomic   12
fundamentals saw improvements in South Asia and Africa, except South Africa.  Most of these 
countries did not experience credit or asset price booms, or large current account deficits as in 
Europe and the US. Most South Asian countries did not borrow abroad directly in private capital 
markets, with the exception of India, which also received substantial amounts of FDI). 
Among developing countries with a capital account surplus, several analyses point to 
China’s pegged exchange rate to the dollar as a cause of the worsening global imbalances
19 and 
there have been calls for appreciation of China’s currency to reduce global imbalances. An 
appreciation of the yuan would have made Chinese exports relatively less desirable on world 
markets and world imports cheaper in Chinese markets. But given the status quo, i.e., China’s 
extensive holdings of dollar reserves, it would also have had negative consequences on Chinese 
wealth denominated in dollars; an effect whose long term tendency could have been to push 
China away from the dollar and, some argue, to reduce private spending.  Chinese firms 
(especially) and consumers (as well as German and Japanese consumers) have a higher 
propensity to save over their US counterparts. Germany, Japan and the Chinese spend much less 
of their income on consumption and have higher savings to finance investment (consumption is 
70% of US GDP, 57% of GDP in Japan, 29% in Germany and 36% in China). In addition, the 
Chinese economic and financial system does not encourage consumption and borrowing to the 
extent that the US’s does. An immature financial system means that credit intermediation is less 
developed than otherwise would have been the case and credit for consumption purposes harder 
to obtain. Further, in the absence of state-sponsored safety nets or well-developed financial 
intermediaries, Chinese consumers apparently hold high levels of precautionary savings. The 
government of China’s policies towards corporate taxation and personal consumption encourages 
investment over consumption. (IMF WEO April 2008).  Other East Asian countries have also 
                                                 
19 See for instance Obstfeld and  Rogoff (1995a,b)    13
enjoyed surpluses as their export positions have been favorable and because investors have found 
East Asian countries attractive (particularly for FDI). 
In sum, global imbalances are the result of global private and public sector decisions. 
History suggests that persistent and high deficits are rare. Countries end up adjusting; and a 
smooth adjustment is obviously more desirable than a sudden one. To the extent that citizens’ 
preferences (portfolio or other), economic endowments and opportunities differ, some countries 
will spend more than they save and vice versa. If external balances are on a sustainable path, 
these imbalances alone should not be a cause for worry. But, government policies in their 
attempts to foster growth or redistribution can shift these patterns and make them unsustainable. 
More contractionary monetary and fiscal policies in the US, more expansionary fiscal policy in 
China and a more flexible exchange rate regime might have prevented the build-up of “structural 
imbalances”.  In an alternative scenario, tighter macroeconomic and financial policies in the US 
would have meant less of a credit boom, lower asset prices and lower aggregate demand. The 
same holds true for other current account deficit countries that integrated swiftly in global 
markets. But it was harder for the smaller open economies to manage their economies in the face 
of a global credit onslaught. More constrained aggregate demand would have led to smaller 
CADs. In China, an alternative scenario would have meant a more appreciated exchange rate, 
looser fiscal policy, a more market oriented economy, a developed financial sector and a lower 
CAS. Middle East oil exporters would have boosted domestic demand more by increasing 
spending. Similarly, there would have been higher spending in Germany and Japan. Germany 
has had a CAS for a while, and its government has been relatively frugal as has been its aging 
(and eventually declining) population. Japan’s alternative macroeconomic scenario is more 
complicated. Along with expansionary fiscal measures, Japanese citizens have increased savings   14
during 2000-06. In 2006, national savings were 27% of GDP, rose to 29% in 2007 and declined 
to 23% in 2009 during the crisis while public debt stands at almost 200% of Japan’s GDP.
20  
Finally, it must be noted that the facility with which the US has borrowed on world capital 
markets has had a lot to do with the dollar’s status as a reserve currency. Portfolio choices made 
around the world have a significant effect on how large a CAD country can finance. Creditor 
countries hold significant amounts of dollar assets. In the wake of the crisis, countries have 
wanted to diversify their reserve currency holdings. Faith in the dollar as a store of value and in 
the US financial system as a safe (and liquid) haven has declined. However, the rise of other 
currencies (e.g. the Euro, whose prominence had already been rising) will depend on the depth 
and liquidity of financial markets in these currencies and in the ability of countries to change 
currency composition without causing large changes in their wealth. As other financial markets 
develop, other currencies will become more attractive for risk diversification purposes. The 
dollar will continue as the prime reserve currency for the near future for lack of alternatives and 
probably because large changes in asset composition will reduce the price of the dollar and the 




Global imbalances have existed for a while. So the trigger for the collapse in financial 
markets was not a “sudden realization” that imbalances in various countries were unsustainable; 
nor was there a sudden and unusual jump in the US CAD in either 2007 or 2008 (Figure 1). The 
trigger was in finance, or rather the failure of finance in US mortgage markets. Various types of 
innovations occur in financial markets, many aimed at changing the risk-reward profile that each 
institution has, at increasing market share, or at reducing the costs associated with regulatory 
                                                 
20 http://www.jil.go.jp/kokunai/statistics/databook/2009/01/p033_t1-8.pdf 
21 See Cohen, Finance and Development, September 2009, Vol 45, #3.   15
compliance. The most talked about innovation for a while has been the mortgage “originate and 
distribute” model used in the US financial sector whereby those who gave mortgage loans did 
not keep them on their books but distributed away the risks associated with them through 
securitization. The securitization frenzy in mortgage markets reduced incentives for lenders to 
carefully screen or monitor borrowers as they did not expect to keep these loans on their balance 
sheets. In addition, the repackaging was complex so the risks of the securities and the quality of 
the underlying assets hard, and perhaps even impossible, to ascertain. This financial innovation 
led to risks originating in one sector being spread across the economy and through rising 
leverage, being magnified. 
The regulatory and supervisory system had fatal flaws. Under existing regulation, 
securitization meant firms could move mortgage-backed assets off-balance sheet and reduce 
capital charges. The regulatory and supervisory system depended excessively on the private 
sector and on markets to monitor and restrain financial intermediaries from excessive risk-taking 
and assumed that market prices embodied all relevant information (as witnessed through their 
reliance on rating agency assessments, internal bank models used to estimated risk, and mark to 
market valuation to evaluate risk).  Finally, regulation and supervision only considered micro-
prudential aspects. It assumed that if individual banks were safe, then the whole financial system 
was managing risk effectively and was safe.  They ignored the fact that summing individual 
banks’ risk was not sufficient to gauge aggregate risk; endogenous risk was not incorporated into 
regulatory requirements. In good times, regulators ignored the systemic importance of individual 
institutions (e.g. size, leverage, interconnectedness). A complicating factor was that the links 
between unregulated and regulated entities were pervasive and it was difficult for supervisors 
and regulators to understand the extent of affecting the regulated system or the implications of 
this interconnectedness. Many of these weaknesses in the regulatory and supervisory framework   16
were shared across countries. Investors and supervisors together misjudged the possibility of bad 
outcomes (the fat tail distribution problem) and the magnitude of possible losses. Meanwhile, the 
vast US financial system became more and more leveraged and interconnected. 
 
II. The Crisis 
 
II1. The Beginning of the End: 2007 
 The first signs of trouble emerged in July 2007 but conditions worsened near the end of 
the year and markets crashed in 2008. It is hard to know exactly what triggered the crash of the 
financial system. Default rates on mortgages had started increasing in the US subprime market 
(Frank and Heisse, May 09, DellAriccia et al., 2008) and accumulated losses (defaults) on 
mortgages reached levels that apparently began to create problems for certain lenders. It is 
uncertain why these losses appeared at that particular time since property values continued to 
rise. One possibility is that the stock of creditworthy borrowers was rising at a slower rate than 
the rate of credit. As losses grew, participants in financial markets realized that their magnitude 
could be large, but, key to the ensuing panic, they did not know in which financial intermediaries 
the risks were the largest. The problem of rising mortgage defaults was transmitted through the 
financial system to various financial intermediaries including insurance companies, investment 
funds, (and stock markets), which led to an insidious magnification of creditor-debtor problems 
and inability to gauge counterparty risk accurately. The flood of credit had destroyed good 
judgment. And then there were “animal spirits” that attacked financial markets. 
As weaknesses emerged in successive financial institutions, the value of securitized 
assets fell. There was a consequent scramble for liquidity and “deleveraging” as financial 
institutions rushed to raise capital. The stock market crashed in the panic. The same wealth (and   17
liquidity) effects that had encouraged consumption the year when credit was easily available to 
borrowers now discouraged spending in the US. Some analysts pinpoint the critical moment to 
the Lehman Brothers case and the US refusal to prop up this institution. Others contend that even 
if Lehman had been “rescued” by the US authorities, the crisis of confidence may still have 
occurred by the very fact that Lehman needed rescuing. The knowledge that large institutions 
that were traditionally thought to be “safe” were struggling for liquidity would have had this 
effect.  
22 
Developing countries suffered directly through the deleveraging actions of financial 
intermediaries that were intent on raising capital and as a result of the flight to financial products 
that were viewed to be less risky than developing country assets.  There was a withdrawal of 
funds from emerging market stock markets, a rise in emerging market bond spreads, depreciation 
of their currencies (or a run-down in reserves) and generally tighter access to credit. Between 
2006 and 2008, Bulgaria’s EMBI showing that the spread on Bulgarian bonds increased from 66 
basis points to 674, Poland’s from 47 to 314, Argentina’s from 216 to 1704, Chile’s from 84 to 
343 and South Africa’s from 84 to 562. The overall global EMBI spread rose from 171 to 724bp.  
Among developing countries, those in emerging Europe which had some of the highest CADs 
going into the crisis were badly affected by the tight credit conditions. Even though foreign 
banks own large portions of many of these countries’ financial systems, the banks felt parent 
banks’ financial constraints. As the region’s credit boom ended, so did the housing/asset price 
booms. Where fixed exchange rates had particularly encouraged excessive foreign borrowing, 
the situation was relatively worse. Countries in emerging Europe and Central Asia also suffered 
                                                 
22 Perhaps in the latter scenario, the collapse would have been less severe since the government’s backing 
would have been certain. The US government backed AIG and the crisis continued. The government judged that it 
would be worse for the “confidence factor” to let AIG sink in the aftermath of Lehman. The counterfactual is hard to 
evaluate when markets are characterized by unpredictable (and by definition, very volatile) “animal spirits”.  
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dramatic declines in trade and falling revenues as commodity prices, and remittances fell. In 
South Asia, India’s stock prices plummeted as capital flew out, reserves fell and domestic 
liquidity tightened. India’s currency depreciated and short term interest rates rose. The collapse 
of trade and domestic demand meant housing construction, information technology, and 
consumer durables took a hit. (However, India still had and has positive growth). In Latin 
American countries, FDI had fallen by 45% by mid-2009 relative to the previous year (ECLAC) 
exports and imports by 30%, and the terms of trade by 30%. In East Asia the capital inflows of 
early 2008 had turned to outflows by late 2008.  
Many low income developing countries did not feel the overall impact of the financial 
crisis through their financial sectors as their financial systems are not well integrated into global 
markets. Even countries such as Madagascar, Mozambique, Uganda, Zambia, Botswana, Ghana 
and Cameroon in Africa with 60% of banking assets held by foreign banks did not feel the shock 
as these banks have solid domestic deposit bases from which they fund local activities and banks 
did not withdraw funds away from these markets. But the financial crisis had real effects on poor 
developing countries (a) reducing demand for developing country exports, (b) by causing a sharp 
drop in commodity prices, (c) by drawing formal trade finance instruments away from them in 
favor of developed country firms or by reducing the access of smaller firms;
23 and (d) through 
falling remittances. Remittances which had reached US$338 billion in 2008 fell by 6% in 2009 
(See figure 2e). Countries in Latin American, emerging Europe and Central Asia saw the largest 
declines in 2009. Countries with sharply lower remittances are seeing aggregate demand decline 
steeply (for example Armenia and Moldova). Remittances to South Asia and Africa were broadly 
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certification/guarantees etc from banks) but the demand for formal bank involvement in securing payment has 
increased. The higher demand for this type of trade finance for all parties, in a situation where credit is already 
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stable. South Asia saw a huge jump in remittances of 35% in 2008 and the level was maintained 
in 2009.
24 
The economic crisis had a magnified effect on world trade. Trade fell faster than income 
around the world- a result of the confluence of the decline in commodity prices, the decline in 
financing and the globalised production structure for many goods. In 2009 world GDP fell by -
0.8% but trade fell by 12.3%. Production for many manufactures is spread out among different 
countries and each time a product crosses borders its value is recorded in gross value terms while 
GDP only measures the value added of production. So when GDP declines, the measured decline 
in trade may be much larger.
25 East Asia was hit particularly hard by the decline in trade.
 The 
example of trade in semiconductors produced in the East Asian region illustrates how integrated 
production structures have affected trade volumes. Product semiconductors need to be 
customized for various end uses which today range from automobiles and heavy machinery to 
consumer electronics and personal computers. This allows firms/clusters located in different 
countries to specialize in particular varieties of semiconductor design and manufacture. Most 
newly industrialized East Asian economies such as Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore are 
simultaneously significant exporters and importers of semi-conductors. For example, Korea 
exports almost 90% of the chips it manufactures, but imports almost a comparable volume of 
chips
26.  Countries in Latin America by contrast, suffered less from this type of effect as 
production structures tend to be less integrated across countries. 
                                                 
24 Migration and Development Brief 11. Migration and Development Team, DECPG, WB. Nove 3, 2009. S. Ratha, 
Mohapatra, and Anil Silwal.  
25 This latter effects means that a final good that is traded between countries A and B for example, may have been 
partly assembled in C and partly in D before final assembly in B for shipping to A. B’s GDP will record only the 
value added by B but the trade value to A will include the value added in C and D. so while B’s GDP falls by the 
smaller amount, the decline in trade reflects the whole value of the product . Note that when D stops manufacturing 
the intermediate input to ship to C, it will record a decline in value added in GDP and a commensurate decline in 
trade values. C will record a drop in the whole value of its contribution as well as the contribution of D. 
26 Wendy Dobson (1997), Crossing Borders: Multinationals in East Asia in Dobson and Yue (ed) Multinationals and 
East Asian Integration, International Development Research Centre(IDRC), Ottawa and Institute of South-East 
Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore, pg 223-225   20
The initial disturbance in US financial markets led to the propagation of several shocks to 
developing countries: 
  A capital account shock leading to a drying up of international (and domestic) credit  
  A trade shock and a terms of trade shock  for many as demand for their exports fell along 
with commodity prices
27 
  A shock to earnings due to a drop in workers’ remittances  
  A confidence shock to consumer/ investor and/or government faith in the ability of markets 
to deliver welfare improving outcomes. Some have referred to this disenchantment as a 
switch in ideology though this characterization seems an overstatement. Economists have 
been debating the pros and cons of more (or less) government regulation ever since Adam 
Smith’s coining of the phrase “invisible hand”. Often historical precedent or sharp changes in 
political or economic power have shaped preferences regarding the appropriate role for 
government. For example, Continental Europe has traditionally voted for more government 
intervention than has the US. The dramatic changes in income that occurred in 2008-09 and 
the inequalities revealed by the shock are bound to raise questions about the value of existing 
market structures and the extent of government involvement needed in the economy to 
support citizen welfare. It has revived the conflict between those who favor “rationality” 
versus those who favor animal spirits as the primary determinants of individual behavior in 
financial markets. And as the crisis was an international one propagated through finance and 
trade markets, there is questioning about the value of global integration. But these questions 
have been debated after every financial crash. 
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II.2. Policy Responses to the Crisis 
  Policy responses to deal with the economic crisis have been wide-ranging. All countries 
affected have adopted fiscal, monetary, and/or financial sector policies to arrest the decline in 
output, to stabilize their economies and to protect the vulnerable.  
As the financial system began collapsing, the US and EU governments took action. The 
Federal Reserve has provided unprecedented amounts of liquidity to markets in an attempt to 
counteract the liquidity crunch that was associated with deleveraging and heightened risk 
prospects.  From September 10, 2008 to January 2009, the Fed’s deposits from non-traditional 
programs jumped from 32 billion to 828 billion dollars. During this time, currency increased 
only moderately but the monetary base doubled (Anderson, 2009, p13).
28 The US Federal Funds 
rate was successively reduced from 1.81 to 0.15% during this period. The Fed’s actions to raise 
liquidity were accompanied by various other measures: it purchased collateral of uncertain 
quality from financial institutions to reestablish the market for certain asset categories, bought 
treasuries from the public, provided longer term credit and provided swap facilities to foreign 
central banks. The EU cut policy rates and banks have been granted essentially unlimited access 
to central bank liquidity at the ECB’s key policy rate. In a coordinated effort, governments 
provided fiscal support to the banking system, through recapitalization, guarantees for interbank 
credits and asset support schemes. 2-3% of GDP was committed by Euro area governments to 
stabilize the financial system. Non-standard measures include: increasing the number of 
counterparties taking part in refinancing operations (the number increasing from 1700 to 2200), 
broadening the list of assets that could be used as collateral, and central bank readiness to 
provide unlimited liquidity.
29 
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29 Wall Street Journal, Stark: IMF Boost is Helicopter Money” , April 7, 2009.   22
Outside the US and Europe too, there has been an unprecedented use of expansionary 
monetary policy to counter the incentives for credit withdrawal by the financial sector. Several 
emerging markets (such as Brazil, Romania and India) have used interest rate cuts to raise 
market liquidity. However, in many developing countries too, interest rate cuts were not 
sufficient to make up for the perceived increase in counterparty risk so credit markets remained 
illiquid. Additional measures aimed at dealing directly with the increase in perceived 
counterparty risk were several- central banks took more risky collateral, acted essentially as 
market maker, increased the number of counterparties they interacted with, provided longer term 
credit for an expanded set of collateral, reduced reserve requirements, guaranteed the availability 
of foreign exchange and so on. In E. Asia, central banks have reduced policy rates in all middle 
income countries, Vietnam and the newly industrializing economies (except Singapore).  Among 
other measures, China and Indonesia for example, cut minimum reserve requirements for dollar 
deposits, and Indonesia and Vietnam increased rates paid on required reserves and many 
extended the coverage and maturity of central bank operations.
30 In South Asia, India reduced 
the repo rate, reduced the reserve ratio, and established an exclusive repo facility to support non-
bank financial intermediaries among other things. In terms of financial market actions, regulators 
practiced forbearance, or suspended mark to market accounting, guaranteed bank deposits, or 
guaranteed loans to companies, or recapitalized financial intermediaries through bond or equity 
purchases, and in some cases closed them.   
Some countries allowed exchange rates to depreciate substantially while others have 
staunchly defended their pegs. For those that defended their pegs, a loss in financial wealth and 
credibility resulting from a devaluation were perceived to be worse outcomes for the longer term 
than the adjustments required under a fixed exchange rate regime.  Many East Asian countries in 
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1998 made a different choice; they abandoned their pegs (Hernandez and Montiel, 2003) or 
managed exchange rate regimes and adopted floating rates. Most East Asian countries entered 
the crisis of the late 1990s with much smaller current account deficits and debt than their ECA 
counterparts. Indonesia for example, decided to have greater exchange rate flexibility. Malaysia 
opted to impose capital controls and maintain its exchange rate peg after an initial devaluation.  
In Latin America, Chile opted to float its currency around the time of the Asian crisis when 
contagion effects were felt around the world.  During this crisis, several large governments 
moved towards managed floats and drew down international reserves where possible (e.g. Brazil, 
Mexico, India and South Korea). 
In the current crisis, among the largest seven Latin American countries, currencies were 
devalued around 30% while interest rates were reduced. By late 2008, E Asian currencies had 
depreciated in nominal trade weighted terms except for those of China and the Philippines. 
Though Korea and Indonesia saw large amounts of foreign capital being withdrawn and currency 
depreciation, they were able to weather the financial crunch as they had learned the importance 
of holding large reserves during the 1997-98 crisis. In South Asia, the Indian rupiah depreciated 
substantially. In emerging Europe, Latvia, Macedonia and Belarus have maintained pegged 
exchange rates (at the time of writing), while others such as Hungary, Poland, and the Czech 
Republic have maintained floating rates; and their exchange rates depreciated. In choosing an 
exchange rate policy response many countries have weighed the balance sheet effects of a 
devaluation on wealth (as residents had borrowed in foreign currency) and the credibility of the 
monetary authorities against the potential of a faster boost to the tradable sector and reallocation 
of resources. Both growth and distributional consequences would have been considered.  
  Most developed countries have engaged in fiscal stimuli that have included a variety of 
measures in addition to the previously mentioned initiatives to support the financial sector. The   24
US approved a stimulus package worth US$150 billion (less than 1% of GDP) in 2008 but 
almost 5% of GDP during 2008-2010 in cumulative terms (not including bank restructuring 
costs).
31 The stimulus package covered transfers to households and temporary tax reductions. 
The US guaranteed the rollover of loans to the car industry- an action that sparked significant 
controversy about the proper role of government. The UK had temporary VAT cuts, brought 
forward planned investment projects, had a small enterprise loan guarantee scheme, and 
subsidies for the automobile industry, among other things. Initially, the EU relied on automatic 
stabilizers but eventually adopted an EU-wide program and member countries had national plans 
as well. EU countries discretionary fiscal measures of around 1.5% of GDP. In addition, member 
countries such as German, and France have taken measures to support the troubled automobile 
industry. Japan’s economic stimulus reached up to 5% of GDP and its fiscal plan included an 
employment program, an expanded investment program and subsidies to help the car industry.  
Many developing countries also took a number of fiscal actions in 2008. In the LA region 
for example, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and others undertook fiscal expansions (in 
contrast to the 1998 financial crisis when fiscal policies were contractionary). Mexico’s stimulus 
plan amounted to 1.5% of GDP and Brazil’s to about 0.5% of GDP.
32 In East Asia, China’s 
stimulus package has been the largest relative to GDP. China has adopted measures to help 
certain sectors, such as the automobile sector and steel; others have undertaken to help export 
sectors through preferential or subsidized loans, or through the provision of guarantees on loans 
among other things. LICs in East Asia have had little or no capacity to finance fiscal stimuli and 
have looked to foreign aid to fill the gap between enhanced expenditure needs and falling 
revenues. Countries in Europe and Central Asia embarked on enhanced unemployment 
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insurance, provided subsidies to retain employment in firms, launched public works schemes, 
reduced tax rates, and increased social assistance payments and transfer payments to the poor. 
Among South Asian countries, the Indian government’s fiscal stimulus resulted in the deficit 
rising from 2.7% of GDP in 2007-08 to 6.2% of GDP in 2008-09. Measures included tax relief, 
and increased expenditure on public projects to create employment and public assets.
33 
Bangladesh had a stimulus package that consisted of cash subsidies, augmented social security 
schemes and loan facilities.
34 
However, many emerging markets faced problems that were distinct from those in most 
of the developed world. These are well illustrated by the experience of several countries in 
emerging Europe. Estonia, Macedonia, and Latvia did not adopt fiscal stimulus plans in response 
to the global crisis. The large financial and trade shocks had a strong negative impact on their 
fiscal deficits raising concerns about debt sustainability. In order to maintain confidence in the 
economy, the government and the currency, these governments further reduced their fiscal 
deficits and undertook discretionary measures that were contractionary or procyclical (countering 
the effect of large automatic stabilizers).In a sense, these measures may be considered to be 
“contractionary stimuli” in the sense that the alternative of discretionary expansions would have 
had a negative effect on private activity and perceptions. In their case, increased public debt, and 
a fear of run-away public finances would have destabilized the economies further. However, 
these countries used prudential measures and central bank support to stabilize their financial 
sectors, and donor financing to fill external gaps and restore confidence in the economy and 
financial system. 
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III. Policy Choices and Some Lingering Questions 
 
In the wake of the crisis, a number of policy questions regarding the management of 
booms, crises, and integration in world markets are being debated. The presumption is that 
governments’ policy choices could mitigate the severity and collateral effects of market 
determined booms and busts and that booms should be “managed”.  
Do we want to kill booms and if so, how? Criticism of the pre-crisis boom years is based 
on the theoretical and empirical view that booms are often followed by busts (Reinhardt and 
Rogoff, 2009). While long run upward trends in output are desirable, growth above “trend” is 
supposedly unstable, will probably be “corrected” or end in a crash.
35 I n  b u s t  y e a r s ,  
policymakers examine the policies that exacerbated the downturn. The growth literature has 
shown that volatility is bad for long run growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995). Others have noted 
that financial sector developments can have significant impacts on output volatility (Rogoff and 
Reinhardt, 2009) and that financial sectors that are large relative to GDP may be associated with 
higher volatility by magnifying shocks (Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz, 2000). An important 
question in this crisis is how countries are affected by growth crashes, rather than pure volatility. 
There is some evidence to suggest that large growth crashes have long term effects on 
productivity and long run growth.  
Figure 3 below shows some possible scenarios for income growth before and after a 
growth collapse. In the figure income is growing at rate g0 until the crash at time t1, when the 
level of income drops from y0 to yC. As drawn, there is an immediate recovery (V shaped).
36 
But the recovery could follow path g0’ which has the same growth rate as g0 or a lower growth 
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path, g1. For g0’, it will reach y0 again at time t2 and for g1, it will reach y0, much later at t3. 
Alternatively, if the economic boom is managed and output grows more slowly from t0, then it 
may be that the crash would not occur at all and the economy would be on path g2 (or the crash 
would be smaller) or g3. For path g2, income reaches y0 at t4. Income reaches y0, only at time t5 
for path g4. Which path is preferable depends on the risks associated with each path and the 
values attached to foregone income at different t. The simple diagram does not capture all the 
complexities of the story. For example, different growth paths and crashes may have quite varied 
distributional effects. But it demonstrates that there are many alternative scenarios that output 
can take.  
If booms should be contained, how should this be done? In the wake of the 2008 financial 
crisis, the focus has been on limiting credit growth which was very high in the 2000s, 
particularly the latter half of the 2000s. Many credit booms have ended in a financial sector crisis 
and a growth crash.
37  So the presumption is that booms must be dampened. Slower credit 
growth would probably have meant less investment (e.g. in real estate) and lower consumption 
and therefore a lower rate of income growth. In practice, the key questions are when 
governments should slow credit booms, how much to intervene and what policies to use. 
Experience indicates that a mix of different policies, monetary, fiscal and financial, should be 
used to prevent overheating.   
The first sign of danger in world markets was the presence of large “structural 
imbalances”. Consumption or investment booms in several countries supported by fiscal, 
monetary and exchange rate policies produced large current account imbalances that were 
sustained over several years. Economic history has shown that periods with large current account 
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deficits can end in sudden and dramatic adjustments in relative prices and quantities across 
countries (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995) and these imbalances are rarely sustained over long 
periods. On the other hand, many countries may view policies supporting high current account 
surpluses as a way of reducing financial risk in global financial markets. When large countries 
hold large surpluses, their actions in global financial markets may however be   destabilizing for 
world markets.  So the first ‘lesson’, an old one, is that countries should try to maintain moderate 
external imbalances and certainly to be wary of increasing imbalances (particularly at a fast rate) 
over a period of years.  If countries had maintained smaller current account surpluses and 
deficits, asset price bubbles may have been contained reducing the probability of a crisis or a 
dramatic adjustment in prices occurring. Reducing imbalances means conducting appropriate 
macroeconomic policy (by modifying aggregate demand and exchange rates) as discussed in the 
text and large countries have a disproportionate share of the responsibility for containing global 
market problems. 
Fast credit growth has been defined as a credit boom when the growth rate’s deviation 
from the trend growth rate is greater than 1.5 times its historical country-specific standard 
deviation and when the annual growth rate of the ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP 
exceeds 10 percent (Mendoza and Terrones, 2004, and Dell’Ariccia et al., 2005). Once a credit 
boom is identified by such criteria, monetary policies and prudential regulation (e.g. raising 
interest rates or reserve requirements, specific prudential regulatory limits on credit to the private 
sector, higher capital charges on certain categories of assets, requiring borrowers to have a 
certain threshold of income etc) can be adapted to moderate credit booms. Thailand during 2000-
04 demonstrates that good policy can limit credit growth. Credit-card debt was doubled during 
this period and the Bank of Thailand put in place prudential curbs to limit the growth of such 
debt, established ceilings on outstanding debt balances and minimum income requirements for   29
card holders.  These policies served to substantially slow the annualized growth rate of credit-
card debt (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006).  Where lending in different currencies is prevalent, 
fast credit growth may lead to an additional source of uncovered risks, those presented by 
volatile exchange rates, as evidenced by the experience of some countries in emerging Europe 
and Central Asia.  These sorts of risks may be best managed through prudential regulation (e.g. 
additional charges for foreign exchange denominated loans, requiring that borrowers have a 
source of foreign exchange or more exchange rate flexibility). 
When fast credit growth is accompanied by asset price booms, consumption and 
investment growth and leverage are seen to increase at the same time. Monetary policy may be 
adjusted to moderate asset price booms. The arguments against using monetary policy to respond 
to asset price booms (for example when credit growth overall may not be characterized as a 
“boom”) are that asset price bubbles are hard to identify, monetary policy is a blunt instrument 
with which to target asset price bubbles as it will slow overall activity, and the effect of higher 
interest rates on asset prices are uncertain.
38 These statements are true to some extent.  But 
arguments in favor of using monetary policy to manage asset price booms are persuasive. 
Prudential regulation and supervision are not always effective in slowing lending or leverage to 
the extent desired, particularly when regulations can be avoided or simply because regulators 
cannot foresee the consequences of every financial innovation. When there are accelerations in 
credit growth and continuous innovation, financial sector supervision and regulation has a 
difficult time keeping up with market changes and constraints on monetary policy may be 
needed. Moreover, when times are good, financial sector participants always tend to 
underestimate risk. Another reason for monetary policy intervention is that credit growth not 
only supports asset price booms but also consumption growth. A boom in one asset class “spills 
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over” into other sectors (for example, housing price booms mean greater household wealth and 
as seen, higher aggregate demand and higher borrowing by homeowners) propagating the cycle 
of appreciation and increasing leverage. Asset booms may therefore “lead” to excessive credit 
demand and levels of leverage that become unsustainable when asset prices fall. Even if asset 
price increases are high relative to interest rate changes, a dampening impact on demand would 
be expected from tight monetary policy.  
Prudential regulations have come under attack in the wake of the crisis for not having 
incorporated the macro impacts of financial sector regulation, that is, for being based on the 
notion that it was sufficient for financial regulation to concentrate on individual bank safety 
rather than the risks inherent in the whole financial system. Macro-prudential regulation attempts 
to account for the endogenous and macro responses of the system to individual shocks and thus 
to mitigate volatility in the financial system. Suggestions are to establish a set of rules that would 
be applied to limit credit growth when certain risk factors are magnified. The emphasis on rules 
comes from the notion that few regulators or supervisors are willing to tighten regulations on a 
discretionary basis in good times. A key change to prudential regulations would be to reduce the 
pro-cyclicality of the Basel II requirements. Currently, capital adequacy ratios (CAR) rise and 
write-offs increase when profits fall having a further tightening effect on credit markets. So 
adjusting regulations would mean multiplying the CAR by a factor relating to macro-prudential 
risk. When there is increasing systemic risk, i.e., at times of increasing leverage, large maturity 
mismatches, fast credit expansion and asset price increases, the multiplication factor on the base 
CAR  would be greater than unity so as to smooth the boom cycle. Conversely, it would be less 
than unity in periods of deleveraging.
39 Additional macro-prudential measures might involve 
setting maximum loan to value ratios (for mortgages), or additional charges for increases in 
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foreign currency debt.
40 In boom years, by lending more, financial institutions tend to increase in 
size. Regulations that imposed extra charges (whether for some form of deposit insurance or in 
terms of additional capital charges) on companies that grew above a certain rate would put limits 
on growth. Regulators’ reliance on market prices to assess profitability or risk may exacerbate 
market instability. Mark-to- market accounting and use of credit ratings in regulation may have 
this effect. Reforms to mark to market accounting would aim to reduce the magnitude of booms 
and busts in asset prices when financial intermediaries as a group attempt to obtain liquidity (in 
bad times) or to lend (in good times). The use of credit rating agencies in supervisory/regulatory 
assessments are being revisited as using these to regulate may enhance the depth of boom –bust 
cycles or simply create perverse incentives for not revealing important market information. 
Reforms of compensation structures for financial sector employees/ managers are an important 
tool to address the incentives for short term risk taking which may exacerbate boom –bust cycles. 
Improved coordination of home/host country supervision of foreign subsidiaries/branches is also 
desirable to efficiently manage credit booms and crisis periods in particular. But, in designing 
new regulations, it is essential to remember that (a) financial intermediaries will have larger 
incentives to evade rules the more onerous they are; (b) the implications of setting boundaries of 
regulation in terms of what types of firms should be regulated will need to be rethought along 
with the specific new regulations proposed. In terms of how much monetary policy and 
prudential regulations would need to be tightened under different scenarios for credit or asset 
price growth, there are no clear cut answers at present. The effect of a certain policy differs 
depending on country circumstances and policies would have to be adjusted depending on 
country specifics.    
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Emerging market financial crises have often followed periods of heavy capital inflows. 
Another policy candidate to limit credit growth is the use of capital controls. Controls on foreign 
borrowing or taxes on foreign exchange transactions have been widely used in the past. In an 
effort to control inflows (and credit growth) countries have imposed temporary capital controls. 
Chile adopted reserve requirements on capital inflows and succeeded in changing the maturity 
structure of debt. Most recently, Brazil has adopted taxes on capital inflows to limit exchange 
rate appreciation. The wisdom of imposing such controls has been widely debated and there is an 
acceptance that sometimes, some form of control may be warranted to limit damaging effects on 
the economy (Chile, Malaysia). These arguments are not discussed here (see Islam 2000). As the 
recent experience of countries in Eastern Europe shows, domestic credit booms supported by 
large inflows of capital complicated macroeconomic management. Experience indicates that 
while no policy may afford complete protection (as market participants find ways to evade 
controls), countries have benefitted from active interventions designed to restrict cross border 
capital flows.  
Exchange rate policies may also be used to mitigate booms. For example, it is probable 
that fixed exchange rates in many countries encouraged higher capital inflows either in 
expectation of an imminent appreciation of the exchange rate or in the belief that investors would 
not face exchange rate risk. The latter case may be viewed as a moral hazard problem: excessive 
lending or borrowing arising from the belief in the government’s guarantee of the price of 
foreign exchange or of a government bailout in case of devaluation. Exchange rate policy not 
only affects overall credit growth but also debt composition.
41 If fixed exchange rates, and open 
capital accounts encourage large capital inflows and foreign borrowing, or borrowing in foreign 
exchange, then exchange rate flexibility may discourage large amounts of unhedged borrowing 
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in foreign exchange and in addition, help countries to adjust their economies through fast 
changes in relative prices as well as quantities.  
Fiscal policy can play an important role in mitigating booms. First, some countries have 
large automatic stabilizers (e.g. unemployment compensation, social transfers) such that 
government expenditures fall/ rise during high/ low growth and tax revenues rise/ fall during 
high/ low growth. In terms of discretionary action, some countries followed procyclical fiscal 
policies, while others took anti-cyclical measures. The US government deficit rose substantially 
during the pre-crisis period. Moreover, there were explicit fiscal incentives to encourage 
homeownership which combined with expansive monetary policy to raise demand for housing 
loans. Other countries have spent the additional revenues garnered during years of high GDP 
growth (for example, by granting huge public sector wage increases). On the other hand, Chile is 
an example of a country that saved additional fiscal revenues during the copper price boom in the 
pre-crisis period in a special fund. Russia and Kazakhstan did the same as oil prices jumped up. 
If fiscal policy were flexible, a possible tool to use during booms
42 would be a rising sales taxes 
or a surtax on property sales / new construction and higher capital gains taxes on large asset 
holders which are automatically triggered when property and asset prices (or an index thereof) 
rise above a certain rate or level. Another alternative would be to raise consumption based taxes 
temporarily (the mirror image of reducing taxes during downturns) when there is serious 
overheating. Yet temporary increases in taxes are very difficult to justify in any environment and 
the political will to adopt them would be particularly weak when tax revenues are rising. In 
boom years governments have little incentive to manage expenditures, since budgets remain 
manageable even as expenditures are increased. There is little incentive to retire debt as the debt 
                                                 
42 The concept of boom is used loosely to denote any situation where there is overheating or output is growing above 
potential for a sustained period.   34
to GDP ratio is also falling. All three policies: retiring debt, raising tax rates and constraining 
expenditures would help manage the boom.  
Some issues for crisis management. Governments must aim to preserve income in the 
short run, rebuild private sector confidence, and protect the poor.  Governments can best do this 
by focusing on market failures that are exacerbated in the crisis (while laying the foundation for 
longer term improvements) and by establishing policies to address distributional impacts. This 
will generally mean that governments will adopt policies many of which need to be reversed or 
modified in the longer run. For many countries a growth downturn meant the adoption of 
expansionary fiscal and/or monetary policies to support aggregate demand, actions to 
reinvigorate the financial sector, various policies to protect the poor or unemployed, or simply 
containing public deficits and debt. Monetary and financial policies had the primary objective of 
stabilizing the financial sector and supporting credit to the private sector and they have helped 
achieve at least the first goal. Fiscal policy has been effective in bringing about financial stability 
and in creating some consumer/producer confidence. Perhaps these have been the two most 
important aspects of fiscal policy’s stabilizing impact. In terms of the size of the longer term 
multiplier effect on expenditures (and therefore output and unemployment), the evidence remains 
to be collected, particularly as fiscal outlays and impacts occur with a lag. Market volatility has 
evoked demands for more constraint of markets and, as unemployment and poverty has risen, a 
greater concern for distributional issues. As the crisis wanes, there will be two main concerns (a) 
how to reduce the large public debts generated during the crisis; (b) how to withdraw from 
“crisis” related policies; and (c) ascertaining how to put in place policies to prevent the re-
emergence of large structural imbalances that could engender global instability. This section 
covers some issues that need further thought as we assess crisis management policies (some have 
already been indicated in the previous section):   35
1). Short term and long-term goals of macroeconomic policy.  In managing busts, what, if 
any, are the trade-offs between short run policies aimed at pumping up aggregate demand, 
policies aimed at protecting the poor and those important for longer run growth? During financial 
crises, attempts to stabilize the financial sector have been presented as protecting rich bankers at 
the expense of taxpayers. Governments’ first priority must be to prevent a financial sector 
meltdown as this best supports a resumption of growth. In crisis times governments may err on 
the side of more support than needed as information is scarcer than at other times. The share of 
the effort going towards limiting bank failures versus handing out cash transfers to the poor or 
unemployed, or investing in infrastructure is an issue that needs to be resolved on the basis of the 
magnitudes of the various problems and the fiscal tools available to government.  
2) Handling the policy reversal. When is the right time to reverse policies adopted to mitigate 
a downturn and how should governments proceed?  Is it important to establish ex ante rules on 
policy reversal? For example, stipulating that the government or central bank would withdraw 
from the market if the price of an asset rose above a threshold value, or if GDP growth were to 
be above a certain percent in any quarter, taxes reductions would be reversed, or if credit growth 
to the private sector were positive for three quarters, monetary policy would tighten. 
3) How much intervention in specific markets is desirable? When should governments use 
fiscal and monetary policy tools to be a market maker (e.g. buying private sector assets/securities 
directly, deciding which corporations to save and guaranteeing their loans, supporting trade 
finance or mortgage finance). Should the government intervene in particular economic sectors 
(e.g. export sectors or the automobile sector?) in response to a financial crisis? Is there clarity on 
the market failure arguments that justify government intervention, for example, to prevent 
unnecessary liquidations arising from imperfect market information. Finally, in retrospect, were   36
these measures effective in the crisis and are they promoting or delaying longer term 
restructuring?  
4).Automatic stabilizers versus discretion. Are countries with more automatic stabilizers 
and/or fiscal rules doing better in managing behavior in booms or busts?  
5) Monetary, exchange and fiscal policies: sharing the burden. How can monetary and 
exchange rate policy best support fiscal policy in a crisis given initial conditions? What are the 
conditions under which the two should work in tandem? Determining the optimal degree of 
flexibility in exchange rate regimes in response to shocks is hard. Countries around the world 
have had to make choices regarding how much exchange rate variations to allow in managing the 
effects of the global downturn. Exchange rate choices can have dramatic effects on individuals 
and governments through changes in wealth (net foreign assets/liabilities) but also through trade. 
In countries where the private sector had borrowed heavily in foreign currency, it was feared that 
the dampening effect on output of reduced debtor wealth and creditworthiness would be more 
harmful with a devaluation than the decline in trade competitiveness without one. Also, a 
devaluation of the currency had the potential to damage government credibility. But if monetary/ 
exchange rate policies cannot be used, the burden on fiscal policy is increased. 
6) What about international financial integration? It is generally accepted that financial 
markets need regulation (whether of foreign or domestic banks) to manage market failures- the 
extent of regulation in each country is determined based on experience and history (endowments 
and politics) and these change over time. And international financial flows, for similar reasons, 
also benefit from regulation. Capital controls (taxes or other barriers of various kinds on capital 
flows) are one way to regulate financial integration. Capital flows between countries can 
sometimes overwhelm policy makers as shown in the current crisis. In order to regain some 
control over domestic macroeconomic conditions controls may be used to complement other   37
measures. Foreign entry is another aspect of internationalization. Generally foreign entry, with 
and without restrictions on capital movements has been viewed as favorable in terms of 
improving financial sector development, particularly efficiency in operations. Both aspects of 
financial integration would benefit from a renewed look at the regulatory structure governing 
integration and crisis management.  
7) How to limit moral hazard in financial markets? There is a general acceptance that the US 
and other markets could have benefited from more regulation in the pre-crisis period. But 
determining and implementing the optimal degree and type of regulation that helps internalize 
externalities and supports good risk management is difficult. Decades of experience have also 
shown that overregulation of the financial sector increases incentives for evasion and may be 
harmful if poorly designed. But another principal concern is ensuring that penalties are so 
designed in crisis management as well as post crisis that they reduce the incentives for excessive 
risk-taking and reduce moral hazard going forward. So far, countries are struggling with reforms 
as discussed earlier in this paper (pg 32). The main issues will be to limit externalities associated 
with individual banks’/ firms’ actions and in limiting damage during a crisis. An increasing focus 
will be on limits to growth, additional regulations to reduce risk-taking in large and 
interconnected firms, adjusting prudential regulations for their macro impact, and quick 
resolution of damaged financial institutions.  
8) New development directions. Is there a new development paradigm that eschews integration 
in favor of a more inward driven strategy? Countries suffering trade shocks are now questioning 
the wisdom of export- led growth. Yet the terms export-led or outward-oriented growth can 
mean different things to different policymakers. In some usage, export led growth refers to 
especial incentives that support all or some exporting industries at the expense of others. In other 
more traditional usage it has meant reducing the focus on import substitution (not taxing   38
exports). Alternatively, it has meant supporting exports to the extent that export markets face 
higher entry costs (leveling the playing field). These debates are not opened here, but if export 
led growth is simply taken to mean looking externally for markets to complement domestic 
demand rather than substitute for it,
43 it is hard to argue that most economies should not follow 
this strategy. The more important question is how to deal with volatility in international markets.  
9) How much international policy coordination is desirable or feasible? Asking sovereign 
nations to collectively “coordinate” in setting overall macroeconomic targets is a bit far-fetched 
if “coordinate” is to be interpreted as setting policy targets together. Even OPEC countries which 
can see clear and quick gains from cooperation (and have a simple goal- production) have had 
their share of difficulties in establishing and implementing production targets or remaining 
within assigned production quotas.  International discussions around critical issues may help if 
they are perceived to be in individual countries’ (or an important group of countries’) interest. 
But realistically, discussions of China’s surplus, and the US deficit did not engender 
“coordination” pre-crisis. U.S. current account deficits (reaching over $600 billion in 2006) were 
perceived to be a global threat, particularly because the probability of ‘a hard landing of the US 
economy’ was highly likely.  In early 2006, the IMF proposed a multilateral approach to 
addressing global imbalances (it brought together the largest five current account surplus or 
deficit countries -- Euro area, US, China, Saudi Arabia, and Japan – to discuss the design and 
implementation of a medium term strategy to sustain robust growth (of 5% per year during the 
2000-05) while reducing imbalances. The result was 2008. 
In the crisis phase, it is hard to argue that all countries coordinated their fiscal stimuli or 
monetary and exchange policies. In fact, some packages were criticized for being anti-trade (an 
obvious example being the US Buy American provision). Rather, they responded to domestic 
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needs and concerns with domestic long-term macroeconomic prospects. There was some 
coordination in managing capital flows (e.g. short term swap facilities and in dealing with 
foreign bank lending in developing countries) but these have been mostly of a temporary nature. 
Even now in the post-crisis period, there is tremendous variation in views among countries 
about how and when to draw back from expansionary policies and about the longer-term stance 
of macroeconomic policies.  
Discussions on harmonization of financial sector regulations are ongoing and may yield 
some results but only as long as countries are convinced it is in their interest to harmonize 
regulations and to follow international standards. Agreement on standards does not ensure 
effective implementation.  
The bottom line on coordination is that it is good to highlight the dangers of ignoring the 
impact of own policies on world markets (and in rebound, own markets) but expecting 
coordinated solutions worldwide is a grand expectation. First, the best stance for every country 
in terms of a (vague) notion of the “global” good is almost impossible to define. Second, what is 
good for the global outcome may not be the best for a single country so the incentive to commit 
may not be present. Third, implementation and time consistency are problems even if there is 
agreement. There could be broad agreement on certain principles, e.g. countries could agree to 













Y1999 Y2000 Y2001 Y2002 Y2003 Y2004 Y2005 Y2006 Y2007 Y2008
Euro_Area_CAD_%gdp 0.5 ‐0.6 0.1 0.7 0.6 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.2 ‐0.5
Middle_East_CAD_%gdp 2.7 11.3 6.3 4.7 8.3 11.7 20.0 21.1 18.4 22.9
China_CAD_%gdp 1.4 1.7 1.3 2.4 2.8 3.6 7.2 9.4 11.3 9.5
Japan_CAD_%gdp 2.6 2.6 2.1 2.9 3.2 3.7 3.6 3.9 4.8 4.0






















Y1999 Y2000 Y2001 Y2002 Y2003 Y2004 Y2005 Y2006 Y2007 Y2008
Euro area _CA in % worldGDP  0.10 ‐0.11 0.03 0.15 0.13 0.29 0.10 0.07 0.05 ‐0.11
Middle East  _CA in % worldGDP 0.05 0.22 0.13 0.09 0.16 0.23 0.45 0.52 0.47 0.71
China  _CA in % worldGDP 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.36 0.51 0.68 0.64
Japan  _CA in % worldGDP 0.37 0.37 0.28 0.34 0.37 0.41 0.37 0.35 0.39 0.31




















































1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1. Emerging and developing eco 67.7 63.7 73.5 54.0 154.2 222.0 226.8 202.8 617.5 109.3 ‐190.3 ‐6.5
2. Africa 8.2 ‐3.9 1.3 2.0 4.9 13.0 26.0 35.2 33.4 24.2 30.2 44.7
3. Central and eastern Europe 32.3 34.2 5.6 25.9 42.3 61.3 99.9 120.0 173.6 147.1 ‐38.3 13.4
4. Commonwealth of Ind. States & Mongolia ‐13.5 ‐27.7 6.9 15.7 19.0 2.6 30.4 55.1 127.2 ‐127.4 ‐119.0 ‐40.0
5. Developing Asia 0.3 6.3 24.3 23.9 66.9 145.6 85.3 31.8 164.8 127.9 ‐46.9 ‐35.6
6. Middle East ‐6.2 ‐6.5 ‐7.6 ‐19.2 1.4 ‐17.7 ‐53.7 ‐50.0 11.0 ‐120.9 ‐29.5 ‐24.1































1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1. Emerging and developing eco 171.9 164.0 180.5 144.4 161.3 183.9 243.7 241.4 359.0 459.3 312.8 303.1
2. Africa 8.6 7.7 23.1 14.3 17.1 15.8 23.3 23.4 32.1 32.4 27.6 31.7
3. Central and eastern Europe 14.8 16.4 17.4 12.2 13.3 30.0 37.4 58.9 72.0 64.1 30.1 32.5
4. Commonwealth of Ind. States & 
Mongolia 4.7 2.3 4.9 5.2 5.4 13.1 11.6 20.7 26.6 44.4 17.3 22.9
5. Developing Asia 72.2 61.6 53.5 52.4 70.6 64.7 100.5 94.3 138.5 222.6 161.6 138.8
6. Middle East 4.4 5.7 12.3 9.1 17.0 10.4 17.6 14.9 4.0 11.4 17.6 15.7


















Figure 2b. Direct Investment, net 
(logarithmic Scale)  
Source: Authors' computations and  July 2009 WEO, IMF








1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1. Emerging and developing eco 67.0 17.2 ‐76.9 ‐86.4 ‐3.8 10.0 ‐5.6 ‐100.7 39.5 ‐155.2 ‐234.5 ‐195.3
2. Africa 9.1 ‐2.1 ‐7.9 ‐1.6 ‐0.4 5.6 4.2 17.6 9.9 ‐15.8 0.9 4.1
3. Central and eastern Europe 6.7 4.7 0.2 3.1 9.7 25.3 25.9 9.4 ‐7.4 ‐13.2 ‐6.1 4.6
4. Commonwealth of Ind. States & Mongolia ‐0.9 ‐10.0 ‐1.2 0.4 ‐0.4 4.3 ‐4.9 12.9 14.5 ‐36.8 1.6 3.4
5. Developing Asia 54.1 19.7 ‐50.7 ‐60.2 10.3 10.2 ‐5.3 ‐107.2 11.2 ‐65.9 ‐192.1 ‐204.5
6. Middle East ‐9.2 2.1 ‐11.8 ‐16.1 ‐18.0 ‐21.7 ‐36.2 ‐25.7 ‐31.0 ‐12.3 ‐14.4 ‐6.4


























1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1. Emerging and developing eco 21.163 ‐35.502 2.275 14.768 ‐43.321 ‐64.948 ‐98.522 ‐154.139 ‐100.536 ‐59.989 57.568 ‐28.094
2. Africa 4.115 6.938 6.457 8.794 6.203 4.215 0.516 ‐9.993 5.043 11.132 15.128 12.799
3. Central and eastern Europe ‐3.988 0.802 5.186 4.47 ‐2.368 ‐4.127 ‐0.042 ‐7.93 ‐5.959 7.271 26.846 9.609
4. Commonwealth of Ind. States & Mongolia ‐1.914 ‐5.83 ‐5.11 ‐10.764 ‐9.408 ‐7.59 ‐19.619 ‐29.768 ‐5.913 ‐0.725 25.059 6.232
5. Developing Asia 4.162 ‐11.481 ‐13.139 2.622 ‐18.408 ‐13.403 ‐21.717 ‐21.668 ‐36.592 ‐13.065 ‐11.314 ‐40
6. Middle East 8.69 ‐23.378 ‐12.809 ‐8.185 ‐24.392 ‐33.911 ‐27.28 ‐67.036 ‐58.884 ‐75.576 ‐9.416 ‐22.117








































1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
East Asia and Pacific 3,228  3,792  4,333  5,453  6,633  9,526  10,14214,48912,24414,91215,67518,75727,46832,69540,33650,46057,59871,30986,11584,785
Europe and Central Asia 3,246  2,819  3,160  3,253  8,091  7,206  9,728  9,373  13,17011,07212,14311,64712,84414,41820,95530,08937,34150,77757,80149,279
Latin America and Caribbean 5,722  6,765  8,372  8,706  11,04813,33513,50514,38915,82517,60319,98724,22927,91836,60943,33050,12259,19963,23964,71758,481
Middle‐East and North Africa 11,39312,75015,83215,20914,07613,31912,51712,80913,05212,80012,89814,65315,21120,36123,03424,95826,11231,36434,69632,212
South Asia 5,572  6,051  5,933  6,664  9,524  10,00512,29414,55713,35015,08417,21219,17324,13730,36628,69433,92442,52354,04173,29371,955
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Table 1a: The size of the total current account balance of  countries with surpluses (In % of the world Total CAS countries) 
Year  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
US CAD ratio of Total CAS countries (%)  ‐72.7 ‐ 89 ‐ 99.3 ‐ 94.2 ‐ 79.4 ‐ 65.8 ‐ 62.3 ‐ 53.3 ‐ 44.4 ‐ 37.2 ‐ 37.2 ‐ 39.9 
                                      
Japan CAS ratio of Total CAS countries (%)  27.6  25.5  22.7  23  20.7  18.1  14.2  11.5  12.8  8.7  15.9  16.1 
China CAS ratio Total CAS countries (%)  5.1  4.4  4.5  7.2  7  7.2  13.7  16.1  20.2  20.1  30.7  29.4 







Country Group Name/Year  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
1. USA  -3.2  -4.2  -3.9  -4.3  -4.7  -5.3  -5.9  -6  -5.2  -4.9  -2.6  -2.2 
2. Newly industrialized Asian eco  5.7  3.5  4.6  4.9  6.7  6.3  5.3  5.5  5.7  4.4  6.4  5.9 
3. European Union  ‐0.1  ‐1  ‐0.3  0.2  0.2  0.5  ‐0.1  ‐0.3  ‐0.5  ‐1.1  ‐0.8  ‐0.5 
4. Emerging and developing econ  ‐0.3  1.4  0.7  1.2  2  2.5  4.2  5.2  4.3  3.9  2  2.8 
5. Africa  ‐3.2  2  0.3  ‐1.8  ‐0.7  0.3  1.7  5.4  2.9  2.5  ‐3.1  ‐1.7 
6. Central and eastern Europe  ‐4.1  ‐4.7  ‐2  ‐3  ‐4  ‐5.4  ‐5  ‐6.6  ‐7.9  ‐8  ‐3.1  ‐3.9 
7. Commonwealth of Independent  States  8.2  13.7  8  6.5  6.2  8.2  8.7  7.4  4.2  4.9  2.9  4.4 
8. Developing Asia  1.9  1.8  1.6  2.5  2.8  2.7  4.2  6.1  7  5.9  5  5.2 
9. ASEAN‐5  6.3  5  3.9  3.7  4  2.9  2  4.8  4.9  2.6  3.4  2 
10. Middle East  2.7  11.4  6.3  4.4  7.9  11.6  19.3  20.9  18.1  18.3  2.6  7.9 
11. Western Hemisphere  ‐3  ‐2.3  ‐2.7  ‐0.9  0.5  1  1.3  1.5  0.4  ‐0.7  ‐0.8  ‐0.9 
12. Germany  -1.3  -1.7  0  2  1.9  4.7  5.1  6.1  7.5  6.4  2.9  3.6 




Year/Region  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  2007  2008 2009 2010
1.United States  ‐0.96 ‐ 1.31 ‐ 1.21 ‐ 1.40 ‐ 1.41 ‐ 1.50 ‐ 1.62 ‐ 1.62 ‐ 1.33 ‐ 1.11 ‐ 0.72 ‐ 0.71 
 2.European Union  ‐0.04 ‐ 0.26 ‐ 0.08  0.06  0.05  0.16 ‐ 0.03 ‐ 0.12 ‐ 0.19 ‐ 0.32 ‐ 0.37 ‐ 0.33 
3.Emerging & developing economies  ‐0.05  0.28  0.15  0.25  0.41  0.54  0.99  1.29  1.15  1.18  0.48  0.69 
4.Central and eastern Europe  ‐0.07 ‐ 0.09 ‐ 0.03 ‐ 0.05 ‐ 0.08 ‐ 0.12 ‐ 0.12 ‐ 0.17 ‐ 0.22 ‐ 0.23 ‐ 0.11 ‐ 0.09 
5.Developing Asia  0.12  0.12  0.12  0.20  0.22  0.21  0.36  0.58  0.74  0.70  0.88  0.84 
6.Middle East  0.05  0.23  0.13  0.09  0.15  0.23  0.45  0.52  0.46  0.56 ‐ 0.02  0.10 
7.China  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.11  0.12  0.16  0.35  0.52  0.67  0.70  0.65  0.75 
8.Japan  0.37  0.37  0.28  0.34  0.37  0.41  0.37  0.35  0.38  0.26  0.17  0.17 
9.Germany  ‐0.09 ‐ 0.10  0.00  0.12  0.12  0.31  0.32  0.37  0.46  0.39  0.13  0.13 
10.Germany and Middle East  ‐0.04  0.12  0.13  0.21  0.28  0.54  0.77  0.89  0.92  0.95  0.11  0.23 
Source: Authors calculations using WEO 09/2009 
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Table 2a. Housing Prices and Current Account Deficits  
Country  Real Housing Prices   CA Deficit2008 Country Real Housing Prices  CA Deficit2008
   (as % change 2002‐06)  (as % GDP) (as % change 2002‐06)  (as % GDP)
1  Ukraine  230 ‐ 7.19 21  China 31  9.46
2  Estonia  150  ‐10.78 22  Thailand 29  3.06
3  Lithuania  130 ‐ 14.91 23  Australia 25 ‐ 4.92
4  Latvia  120  ‐15.12 24  Finland 25  3.39
5  South Africa  96 ‐ 7.96 25  Norway 25  19.13
6  Poland  66  ‐4.72 26  Italy 22  ‐2.78
7  New Zealand  65 ‐ 9.26 27  Serbia 20 ‐ 18.57
8  Iceland  55  ‐18.2 28  Argentina 15  0.82
9  Denmark  50  1.32 29  Czech Republic 13 ‐ 2.23
10  Spain  50  ‐10.05 30  Colombia 12  ‐2.19
11  France  48 ‐ 2.8 31  Netherlands 12  5.62
12  United States  45  ‐4.63 32  Switzerland 9  9.29
13  Belgium  42  0 33  Malaysia 5  14.8
14  Ireland  42  ‐4.98 34  Singapore 4  19.25
15  Canada  40  0.95 35  Austria ‐3  2.81
16  Hong Kong   40  11.71 36  Philippines ‐5  2.44
17  Hungary  40 ‐ 5.45 37  Indonesia ‐7  0.1
18  Slovenia  40  ‐4.69 38  Germany ‐15  7.31
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Table 2b. Financial Sector  Overview 
Year  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
1. Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP) 
United States  201.5  326.3  288.2  243.5  142.5  166.4  173.8  253.3  309.9  256.7 
United Kingdom  93.4  126.5  128.9  120.7  121.1  171.0  185.5  176.6  372.5  245.1 
China  34.8  60.2  33.9  22.9  29.1  38.7  26.2  61.5  230.4  126.5 
East Asia & Pacific  33.7  49.8  29.3  21.7  28.4  36.3  25.9  52.3  184.1  104.4 
Euro area  55.9  80.4  82.7  65.0  55.2  61.7  73.2  95.7  124.0  91.6 
Europe & Central Asia  12.6  25.4  12.7  11.8  16.1  19.4  20.7  34.8  39.1  23.9 
Latin America & Caribbean  8.1  8.5  6.1  5.0  5.4  7.6  9.9  12.9  24.1  24.7 
Middle East & North Africa  5.3  5.1  2.4  2.3  3.7  7.3  15.9  19.1  18.8  19.0 
South Asia  51.9  90.2  42.5  34.5  46.4  51.4  57.0  67.2  84.8  73.4 
Sub‐Saharan Africa  31.5  32.3  30.0  31.9  32.8  41.2  43.9  60.7 
World  99.6  152.4  134.6  116.3  81.6  95.8  106.6  140.5  185.5  137.4 
2. Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP) 
United States  180.5  154.7  137.5  106.5  130.8  140.3  137.1  147.9  145.1  82.6 
United Kingdom  198.8  177.6  149.9  117.8  134.7  129.9  136.1  157.9  139.2  70.0 
China  30.5  48.5  39.5  31.9  41.5  33.1  34.9  91.3  184.1  64.6 
East Asia & Pacific  42.6  47.1  42.2  35.9  46.7  40.2  40.6  84.9  158.9  58.3 
Euro area  83.4  87.0  68.3  50.9  58.3  61.0  62.7  80.7  85.3  38.0 
Europe & Central Asia  29.4  17.5  18.5  20.7  30.1  31.2  45.9  65.6  76.2  44.6 
Latin America & Caribbean  32.8  31.8  32.5  25.4  29.7  35.6  40.5  49.1  70.8  31.6 
Middle East & North Africa  27.9  19.9  17.9  20.3  27.7  37.1  47.9  48.1  56.0  34.9 
South Asia  33.5  26.1  19.1  22.2  39.5  48.1  60.2  76.9  133.4  45.1 
Sub‐Saharan Africa  118.0  89.7  66.3  83.1  91.8  121.5  130.3  148.5 
World  118.3  102.3  89.4  72.5  87.6  92.6  97.5  111.1  120.7  59.4 
3. Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) 
United States  179.3  170.7  178.9  169.2  184.2  191.2  195.3  202.4  210.1  190.5 
United Kingdom  120.6  131.7  136.9  140.9  145.9  153.2  162.2  174.0  190.0  213.4 
China  111.5  112.3  111.3  118.9  127.2  120.1  114.3  113.0  111.0  108.3 
East Asia & Pacific  103.3  101.1  100.4  105.1  110.6  105.7  101.5  99.0  99.5  100.0 
Euro area  93.7  97.9  99.5  99.8  101.9  103.9  109.2  114.9  121.4  126.3 
Europe & Central Asia  16.9  17.4  18.2  18.6  20.5  23.0  26.3  32.2  38.9  43.1 
Latin America & Caribbean  28.8  27.7  25.3  25.8  23.8  23.9  25.9  31.0  36.3  38.5 
Middle East & North Africa  38.8  38.4  40.3  40.1  39.6  38.7  38.5  40.7  42.0 
South Asia  25.8  27.7  28.1  31.2  31.0  35.2  38.6  42.0  44.4  49.0 
Sub‐Saharan Africa  64.6  61.5  60.0  45.7  54.7  60.7  62.9  66.2  70.7  40.1 
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